The following was the keynote lecture at the XXVII Encuentro Internacional de Ciencias Sociales in Guadalajara, Mexico, December 5, 2013.

On October 3, 2013 the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that there is no Israeli identity, since there is “objectively” no Israeli ethnicity. The 21 litigants will have to continue having the designation “Jewish” in their official files (coded into their identity cards!), instead of “Israeli” as they desired. Against their own wish, they will not be able to share a common citizenship identity with Arab citizens of Israel, in a state that continues to be identified as that of an ethnicity, the Jewish people. Some of the consequences of that identification are well known. Thus, for example, if I wished to ask for Israeli citizenship and membership in the citizen body to which the state is said to belong, namely the Jewish millet, I would be able to do so, though I have never lived in Israel and practice no religion. Many who have lived all their lives in that country would not be able to do the same, unless they converted to Judaism. Even if married according to Islamic law, Arab citizens do not have the right to permanently settle their spouses in Israel. But even I would not be able to marry or divorce in Israel, unless I followed the rules, requirements and rituals of orthodox religious law. And I could not marry a non-Jew in any case.

As all those who have seen the film Hannah Arendt must realize, the great political theorist’s relationship to Israel was deeply ambivalent. She believed that the idea of the modern nation state with an ethnic definition of belonging was at the root of modern (as against traditional) anti-Semitism, and she strongly rejected the idea that its victims, the Jews, living together with another people, should establish such a state themselves. (The Jewish Writings p. 352) Moreover, to put the matter in her own concepts if not words, even if Israel’s formation was an act of liberation (whether from colonial rule or, more broadly, the European nation states) it was not followed by the constitution of freedom. The founders, as is well known, were unable to produce, as required by UN resolution of 1947 and the Israeli Declaration of Independence, a written constitution with equal fundamental rights for all then living in the territory. The constituent assembly elected also with Arab participation was converted into the first Knesset, whose simple majority chose to abandon the project of constitution making, in favor of basic laws that would be produced gradually, by ordinary parliaments. Arendt’s devastating critique of constitution making as acts of government instead of the mobilized and enlightened actions of “the people” themselves, deserves to be well known, however that difference between two approaches is to be understood procedurally.

There are three possible explanations of why Israel failed to produce an entrenched documentary constitution in 1948. The first (and best known) is currently represented by my former student Hannah Lerner, who argues that it was the impossibility of secular and religious actors to agree concerning fundamental rights and the relationship of religion and state. While the latter relations and in particular the surrender of family law to the Orthodox rabbinate were informally agreed upon by the religious Agudat Israel and the secular Mapai of Ben Gurion, in the status quo agreements of 1947, to formalize e.g. a “prohibition of intermarriage” in a written constitution would have been supposedly highly embarrassing and unacceptable at least to the secular side. This is the explanation accepted by Hannah Arendt (Eichman in Jerusalem p. 7), but is not the only relevant one. The second explanation focuses on the power interests of Ben Gurion himself. He was no different than other liberation leaders in the Anglophone colonial world, who believed that it was a Westminster type of parliamentary sovereignty, incompatible with entrenchment, fundamental rights and judicial review, that would give a dominant party and its leader the most power. While Nehru in the end gave way on this matter, probably because of the internal pluralism of his party, and agreed to a well entrenched constitution with strong table of rights and formally codified constitutional review, Ben Gurion, whose dominance over his party was greater than Nehru’s, did not. Finally, I believe there was also the problem of Arab-Jewish relations. Given the fundamental Zionist idea of a Jewish state, it was unacceptable to formally establish equal rights for all citizens, that in the future could perhaps lead to a state of two peoples, or one of all its citizens whatever their ethnic belonging.

The last motivation is the most important because it touches not only the inability to agree on a constitution, but the prior difficulty of constituting a democratic constituent power. It is not obvious in other words whether those participating in such power should be Jews in Israel, Jews and Arabs in Palestine, or Jews in and outside Israel whose state it is supposed to be. The fact that in 1948 a whole multitude was still waiting in displaced people’s camps to make the journey to Palestine was an important consideration for many of the founders of the state. This last consideration hardly applies today when relatively few seek to emigrate to Israel, yet it is reflected in the Supreme Court decision of October 3, this year, recognizing Jews rather than Israelis as the state’s relevant constituency.

It would not be difficult to combine the three explanations, since after all the actors responsible were many and they could have different interests and priorities. In any case the result still stands, in spite of the efforts of the Supreme Court in the 1990s, under Aharon Barak, to turn a couple of very weakly entrenched basic laws into the functional equivalent of a written constitution with rights in their center. Barak even attempted to provide a new interpretation of the definitional phrase “Jewish and democratic state” by arguing that “Jewish” could not contain any element of meaning that was not consistent with democracy. The October 3 decision, made by a court with very different members, reveals his failure, however brave the effort. What would be ordinarily regarded in democratic polities as the imputed constituent subject of a democratic constitution, the Israeli people, does not exist, according to the court. An actor admittedly has been put into its empty place, namely the Jewish people, but even if it existed it does not seem to have the will and the capability of becoming that subject any more than any other people essentially defined. Thus a formal, documentary, entrenched, and enforceable constitution still has to wait.

Hannah Arendt does not mention Israel even once in her important book on constitutions, On Revolution (1963), and mentions the failure of constitution making only once in Eichman in Jerusalem, published the same year, blaming the issue of religious law. She points out the “breathtaking … naivete” with which the prosecution in the Eichmann trial denounced the prohibition of intermarriage in the Nurnberg Laws of 1935. Yet even for the most courageous of 20th Century thinkers, that trial was apparently not the right time “to tell the Jews what was wrong with the laws and institutions of their own country” (p. 8) Is it too much of a stretch however to assume that her contemporary critique of constitutions produced by incumbent governments, without much legitimacy, applied even more to Israel than to European post World War states?

In fact, the very sentence just quoted indicates, that performatively, Arendt was less hesitant than the journalists she mentions to tell Israelis what was wrong with their country. She did much more then that in the 1940s in terms of predictions and proposals. After some involvement in Zionist circles and their politics in the 1930s, in the 40s she became a determined critic of both labor Zionist and Revisionist visions for the future. Her first critique of the Zionists as early as in 1937-8 was complex, but its focus was on an substantialization or essentialization of the Jewish people, on the one hand, and the absence of an autonomous politics based on independence from other powers and with clearly defined friend enemy relations. Later, she implied that Zionism was to make-up for its lack of politics in the 40s, but if anything intensifying the essentialism based on a German inspired rather than French political form of nationalism. (The Jewish Writings pp. 366-367) Arendt regarded the nation state as an obsolete and endangered form that would be replaced by larger units, empires or federations. Only the latter would allow the survival and flourishing of small people like the Jews. (The Jewish Writings p. 371) Yet, according to her provocative thesis it was the program of the revisionists, who were in her view close to being neo-fascists, that was in the end adopted by the whole movement and above all Ben Gurion in the project of a sovereign Jewish ethno-national state. (see piece on Begin in The Jewish Writings p. 417ff and “Zionism Reconsidered” in The Jewish Writings p. 343ff; 351)

Arendt did not wish to easily submit to this outcome; passivity was not a part of her character. Close to Judah Magnes, after first initially opposing him, Arendt went on to propose an Arab Jewish confederation in Palestine, a variant of his idea of a bi-national state included in a larger federation of Middle East. (J. Magnes “Toward Peace in Palestine” in Foreign Affairs, 1943; The Jewish Writings p. 336, 400, 441, 446) She was to call Magnes the “conscience of the Jewish people” (p. 451ff) and she always shared his abhorrence of the absurd notion of a people without land searching for, later actually being in a land supposedly without people. Only the moon is a place without people, she repeatedly wrote. But there were two main features of Magnes 1943 proposal of bi-nationalism in a federation of Ottoman successor states that she strongly opposed. Within the bi-national Palestinian state Jews would be a large minority at best, and within the federation as a whole a small one. This would make the Jewish status one of a vulnerable minority within an “Arab empire”. Secondly, to avoid violation of minority rights, Magnes sought to establish Anglo-American alliance guarantees. Such protection by imperialist powers, resembling the similar role of absolutist princes, would make the Jewish minority their client and agent, a terrible status in a world where she anticipated de-colonization. This idea of the bi-national state to Arendt destroyed the meaning of federation, that was supposed to be made up of “different people with equal rights.” (p. 336) It retained according to her the homogenizing and exclusionary logic of the nation state, that made the so-called minority problem impossible to solve on the bases of equality.

When she partially revised her opinion with respect to the Magnes scheme, her conception of a confederation, replacing bi-nationalism, represented an attempt to save the core principle of federation. It was also a transposition to Arabs and Jews an earlier notion where a non-territorial Jewish people would be a member of the European federation. It was not clear how that idea would work without falling into rigid consociationalism as in Lebanon. She was however happy, if prematurely so, in discovering the idea of a confederation with Jerusalem as its common capital among Jewish, Arab and UN proposals in 1948. (p. 408ff.; 446-7) The idea was in any case free of all Eurocentrism even as she continued to strongly support a federalization of Europe itself, on political rather than economic grounds. (J. Butler review, Compare The Jewish Writings p. 129-131 vs. 447, 450) Once in the United States (after 1941) she came to be even more impressed by the federal idea, that she partially misunderstood as one bringing together distinct and differentiated peoples that nevertheless defined their citizenship in purely political rather than ethnic or national terms. The same federal idea was to be central to both her constitutional proposal, and for the thesis of On Revolution, but of course nothing could be further from it than the unitary state form resembling the Westminster model established by the founders of Israel. If this state was created in a French way resembling the making of the third republic, it was in one fundamental respect different than English and French nation states. Israel’s founders envisaged an “essentialist” ethno-religious rather than a political identity, thus a form of state power limited by religious law in the form an inheritence from the Ottoman era preserved by the British Mandate, the millet system. (cf. Yuksel Sezgin The Israeli Millet system) Hannah Arendt rejected this form of self-definition and self-limitation.

If her encounter with Zionism, helped deepen Arendt’s critique of the nation state so sharp in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1950: on Israel, p. 290, 299), and develop her notion of federalism central to On Revolution, these works remain highly relevant to the problem of Israeli state and constitution at least in a diagnostic sense. If Israel plays no role in the second of these works, and the constitution is only once mentioned in Eichmann, it may have been because by the early 60s she was no longer confident in being able to propose a solution to constitutional problems of this state, already established. She hated to engage in the production of abstract, politically irrelevant utopias. Yet, I believe that the theory of On Revolution, deeply linked to U.S. American solutions and the concept of “revolution” bears some of the burden for the omission. After briefly reviewing this theory, I will try to show that earlier, she did possess concepts that would still be essential for the just solution of the now historical conflict. On these, a missing chapter of On Revolution, one on Israel, could have been based.

In the classical doctrine, whether biblical or republican, the foundation of the new polity presupposes violence generally by a prophet or a political law-giver. Hannah Arendt is deeply disturbed by this assumption, and seeks to go beyond the role of dictating violence with two distinctions. The first is between liberation and constitution, that she saw as two dimensions of a revolutionary process. Where liberation could be and generally was violent, constitution, if it was to be successful, had to be the act of a plurality of actors persuading one another, and making binding promises regarding the future. The second distinction was between the United States and France, where the first succeeded at producing a stable constitution guaranteeing at least constitutionally limited government and the second failed. Ultimately at bottom of this difference were according to her two different conceptions of the constituent power. In the case of the U.S., whether in the states or the Union, the constituent power was already constituted as the power of small republics, whether townships or states. In France, the constituent power of the people or the nation was understood to be in the state of nature, limited by no rules or pre-existing procedures. It was this doctrine that allowed French political agents, whether the Assemblee constituant, the Convention nationale or one man, stepping into the empty place of the sacralized king, to engage in constitution making by government entities that could produce no legitimacy or stability. Arguably the first and all subsequent Israeli Knessets too occupied that place, even if the task of producing a unified documentary constitution has never been resumed. None of the 11 basic laws, including the ones relied on by Justice Barak, nor their 3 revisions, were produced through a wider, more participatory constituent process (Justice M. Cheshin United Mizrahi decision, who imagines this in classical European terms of an extraordinary constituent assembly). After liberation from colonialism, Israel thus chose a generically French path rather than the federal American one, quite contrary to what Judah Magnes and Hannah Arendt among others proposed.

The American path would have meant not only federation in two senses, process and outcome, but also the establishment of an entrenched, enforceable written constitution with a strong table of fundamental rights. Israel was not alone in disregarding the American paradigm. While some of its substantive aspects have been incredibly influential, it is fair to say that the procedures of its first emergence were never successfully adopted elsewhere. The latter involved the making of the constitution in several stages where none of the actors usurp the imputed popular sovereignty of the people, a process in which the drafting assembly possesses no other power than to recommend a constitution to other instances. As Condorcet and Sieyes realized at the time of the French Revolution already, the historical preconditions stressed by Arendt for an already constituted pouvoir constituant, namely small self-governing republics did not exist in France. But even where such bodies did exist, as in many countries of Latin America, they could not play the role assigned to them by Arendt. We can see the reason in the chapter of On Revolution (chapter 6) where she seeks to overcome “American exceptionalism.” I have in mind her famous theory of councils and soviets that she proposes as the alternative to modern political parties produced by modern revolutions. As inspiring her inaccurate history of these political bodies may be, she has to implicitly admit that direct democratic councils, whether in France, Russia or Hungary could not complete a revolution that she defined not merely as the exercise, but also as the institutionalization of public freedom, namely a constitution. Many years before, anticipating her later theory of the “tragedy” of direct democratic councils, she had to admit the same failure for the kibbutzim in Palestine. Bracketing reservations concerning their apolitical and even authoritarian aspects she saw these as the only creative force that was ideologically predisposed to institute either a bi-national state or a confederation of two peoples, but she was forced to see the political weakness of grassroots self government when opposed to the modern party movement, especially given their self imposed “abstention from politics.” (Young-Bruehl Hannah Arendt p. 97, 139 vs. p. 229; The Jewish Writings p. 395; 348-9)

What she did not realize then or later is that it was precisely the setting of a revolutionary rupture, or in her language the violence of liberation, that greatly privileged a disciplined party organization such as Lenin’s against loose democratic organizations that tended to define politics primarily in the local sense. Tocqueville whom she greatly admired did realize, and understood the political vacuum produced by revolution as the birthplace of a new authoritarian alternative. She unfortunately did not fully understand his complex explanation of American exceptionalism in constitutional development, that among its main components relied on the concept of “revolutionary results without having had a revolution”.

Fortunately, Arendt’s proposal for a confederation of two peoples within a larger federation, genetically related to her conception in On Revolution, does not stand or fall with her direct democratic or radical republican theory of agency. Yet a confederation or federation does require agents capable of federating. If the confederation is to be democratic or republican, the agents that produce it must be themselves democratic or republican, or at least strongly attached to an outcome based on free democratic competition under constitutional restraints. Because of the long history of omissions of British imperialism, as Arendt knew so well, such agents were missing on both Jewish and Arab side. While Arendt claims that the Jewish Yishuv was an effective proto-state primarily of the Histadrut (The Jewish Writings p. 436-437) it was a top down, bureaucratic organization capable of producing effective military force, without any democratic experience. Admittedly, the UN Resolution of 1947 ending the British mandate aimed at the creation of two states based on democratic competition, and equal rights under constitutions. Yet, the incredible rapidity of the British departure left no time for such entities to organize themselves. The horrors of the Indian partition had a similar cause, with the difference that Indian political actors by then had long political experience and were well organized. Such political experience was missing in Palestine on both sides. This is why Hannah Arendt rather reluctantly joined Magnes in supporting the failed plan for a temporary UN trusteeship, in an uncommonly tough essay condemning the increased influence of Jewish terrorism, aiming to expel Arabs and to make negotiations between the two people’s impossible. (“To Save a Jewish Homeland,” 1948. The Jewish Writings p. 397-400) In any case, the leaving of the British created the kind of power vacuum Tocqueville noted characteristic of modern revolutions. If it was a liberation, there were two subjects of liberation capable of entering into the space of power, with mutually incompatible claims as Arendt noted following Magnes. We know the outcome. On the Jewish side, those representing the claims of a modern ethno-national state easily defeated small groups representing views such as Arendt’s, at the same time that they militarily triumphed over Arab actors making similar exclusionary claims. Given British supports for at least some of the Arab forces, the process could be still be represented as liberation by Jews, even as it became al Nakhba, the catastrophe, to Arab Palestinians. But it decisively failed as a process of constitution, and that brings us back to today, when there is neither a constitution nor constitutionalism for either Israel of the original armistice lines, or for what has been called the Israeli control system, that includes now also the West Bank.

After the Israeli state was established, but before she saw the need to rehabilitate the concept of revolution, in “Peace or Armistice in the Near East?” (1950) dedicated to the memory of Judah Magnes, Arendt began the essay with the following lines:

Peace, as distinguished from an armistice, cannot be imposed by the outside; it can only be the result of negotiations, of mutual compromise., and eventual agreement between Jews and Arabs. … A good peace is usually the result of negotiation and compromise, not necessarily a program. (The Jewish Writings p. 423; 427)

I leave to the side that today we would say Israelis and Palestinians, instead of Jews and Arabs. The lines retain their validity. Once President Sadat made his trip to Jerusalem in 1978, in spite of the fact that promises regarding the Palestinians were not kept by Israel, there have been serious negotiations among the parties, Israelis and Palestinians. At one time at least, at Taba in 2001, they came close to success, vitiated by the closeness of Israeli elections. Today, talks have been restarted, but the chances of an agreement seem to be slim in the face of obvious sabotage by the settler dominated present Israeli government, indicated by the continued building of settlements that tend to destroy or transform the very object of negotiation, and potentially by Hamas that has been left outside, though it controls Gaza with the allegiance of many in the West Bank. Yet there is no alternative to these negotiations except, as Hannah Arendt knew as well, renewed violence that leads nowhere.

But what are these negotiations to be about, and how are they to be conducted? The parties to the extent they think they are negotiating only over territory, and control over people, cannot be right. They are also negotiating over a constitution or constitutions. Whether the result is supposed to be one state or two states, any possible entity emerging will still be a deeply divided society on ethnic as well as religious grounds. Such societies need written, relatively rigid, enforceable constitutions more than all others. Moreover peace between any new entities, the survival and even deepening of a modus vivendi, the adherence to solemn promises made during the negotiations will depend on both constitutional and international law arrangements that need to be codified along with plausible enforcement. It would be futile to make an agreement concerning state structures without providing at least the main principles for regime forms.

Of course the problem of state structure has to have priority. At the moment it is quite unclear whether the result of the negotiations in the end will be two states or one as many on both Israeli right and left think inevitable, and it is not up to outsiders to make this choice. They can however point out that the same problem would exist for either option, because it will not be possible nor desirable to create ethnically homogeneous states either way. Here Hannah Arendt remains a good guide, and helps us see once again that the choice of a nation state entails the next bad choice between second-class citizenship or expulsion. (The Jewish Writings p. 343-344, 347, 352) Even outsiders can point out furthermore, as Magnes and Arendt did, that there are options that can avoid such a bad choice, ranging from bi-nationalism to consociationalism, or even a confederation not entirely based on territory but also political organization. It is not up to us to decide whether poltical or economic integration of new units should come first, but we can point out that both would be needed for either to be stable and lasting.

It is true that if outsiders came up with concrete and detailed plans, they would wind up only repeating Arendt’s own demonstrable contradictions in these matters, and her frequent change of perspectives that was a function of the rapidly changing context on the ground. In the end she did warn about being attached to plans, and formulae, instead of focusing on genuine negotiations. (The Jewish Writings p. 427) Yet, can the actors do without at least the outline of a plan that would make coming to an agreement attractive to both sides? It can perhaps be said, that the idea common to Magnes and Arendt, of a confederation or federation within a larger confederation or federation, remains normatively the most promising one for Israel/ Palestine and its region. Whatever its troubles today, the EU composed of former violent enemies does indicate that structures such as these are possible. The possibility of a federal Europe was an important part of Arendt’s vision in the 1940s. However mistaken she was about the potentially federal nature of the British Commonwealth (too weak once empire was gone), the federalism of the U.S. (not based on a union of distinct peoples) and the Soviet Union (integrated through one party rule, rather than voluntary union), the example of Europe, then only a dream but today widely imitated shows that she was potentially right. Might this example not be attractive not only to Israelis and Palestinians, but also the other states of the region today each replete with the minority problems she associated with the nation state?

Can there be an international political role in achieving the desired end? Hannah Arendt as a previous quotation indicates believed in federation as autonomous product only of those who seek to federate. Yet, even with the British omissions of the Mandate in her clear memory, she was willing to accept a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, in order to reduce antagonism, and to enable actors capable of fair negotiations to emerge and to develop. (The Jewish Writings p. 399-400) Even the forming of the European Union occurred under the defense umbrella of primarily the United States. For Israel/Palestine the issue however is different. While the Palestinians have lost their Soviet sponsor, with only very tenuous replacements, Israel is indeed under an American umbrella of protection. One of Hannah Arendt’s main criticisms of Zionism has aimed at the desire, inherited form the older assimilationist trend in Judaism, to be under the protection of some “big brother”, first the Ottomans, then Great Britain, with America next, and for a time the Soviet Union, before America’s protective role was settled on after the Suez fiasco of 1956. (ibid. 392 and elsewhere) This is why she insisted on the autonomous agreement only of the parties themselves, representing the peoples of Palestine and Israel. Yet might not the removal of the protective umbrella have the same effect as a trusteeship? Or, instead of the protective umbrella, should not soft power be applied to both sides, to facilitate the making of a just and equitable solution, whose terms should emerge from the parties themselves.

Are these parties and their representatives capable of coming to any serious agreement? Toward the end of his life, Edward Said, whose views in many respects resemble those of Hannah Arendt, became a strong critic of attempts at Palestinian liberation relying on terror. Arendt too was an uncompromising critic of Jewish terrorism. But Said was fortunate enough to live in a period in which a new method linking peace and constitution making emerged. He was highly impressed by the post revolutionary effort in South Africa to devise a democratic system based on equality through negotiations between former enemies who thereby became political opponents. If this was possible in South Africa given the heritage of apartheid, it must also be possible in Israel/Palestine he thought. I think he was right, even if he misunderstood the negotiated many stage character of this process in South Africa. In particular he was in my view deeply mistaken in rejecting negotiations on the Oslo pattern. He of course may have been right that only new actors are capable, I would say on both sides, of acting in an entirely new manner. Yet, still under the influence of populist idea of constitution making Said believed that the key new actor must be the Palestinian people who could generate new institutions from below through an elected constituent assembly. But the Palestinian people is no less an essentialist abstraction than the Jewish people. It is unclear for example whether the constitution making task Said had in mind was based on the constituent power of only people in the West bank, or if he meant to include Arab citizens of Israel, and also Palestinian exiles. (From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map: Essays, 2004 p. 48-49, 186-187, 192)

Originally Hannah Arendt too seemed to believe in a unitary people constituted by Schmittian friend –enemy relations, that she at one time saw as the meaning of the political. Precisely as a result her brave confrontation with the Arab – Jewish conflict, she came to understand that politics could not be based on essentialized friend enemy relations without self contradiction, and the major political task was the mutual persuasion of former enemies to become opponents in a pluralistic field. (compare The Jewish Writings p. 56-57 vs. 351, 359) A historical compromise producing a federation or confederation, especially one within a larger federal entity can be the work only of many actors, within each people, and across a series of negotiating tables. This is the lesson of the recent transitions to democracy, that inspired Edward Said, as it should inspire us.

10 thoughts on “Hannah Arendt, Constitutionalism and the Problem of Israel/Palestine

  1. I am grateful to Dr. Arato for this article. I learned a lot from it. I especially admire the way he weaves the regime question–democracy vs. oligarchy, etc.–and what might be called the `state’ question–nation-state vs. empire vs. federation–into a thoughtful argument, all without taking his eye off the geopolitical issues that beset the region. To do that in such an elegant, succinct manner is very hard to pull off.
    The point about Israel as a parliamentary republic, not an American-style, separation-of-powers republic seems to me very well taken.
    On the matter of the ethnic or nationalist basis for citizenship in Israel, it would be a good thing to add that the U. S. founders derived the rights of citizens from natural rights–that is, from the rights of human beings `as such.’ While they notoriously did not unfailingly respect such rights in all respects, the basic idea remained. An ethnic, national, or (for that matter) religious foundation for citizenship, seen in most countries in the Middle East, is much more exclusionary in principle. So in America it’s something more than the popular sovereignty of Arendt and Tocqueville (and of Stephen Douglas!), and this `something more’ is natural right.
    On the Edward Said proposal for an EU-like solution, I’m much more pessimistic than Dr. Arato, precisely for the reason that he cites at one point: “It would be futile to make an agreement concerning state structures without providing at least the main principles for regime forms.” The EU works (well, so far) because Europeans settled the regime issue. The former violent enemies became republicans of one sort or another. Same thing in South Africa, thanks to Nelson Mandela. Pluralistic political regimes work when both sides agree on some principle that enables them to say, `Your difference is not my problem, and my difference from you is not yours.’ That makes a de Gaulle-Adenauer settlement (for example) politically feasible. This might conceivably occur in an Israel that was located, say, along the U. S.-Canadian border–or, alternatively, next to a formidable enemy shared by both Jews and Arabs–but given the powerful religious and nationalist forces surrounding `Palestine,’ and given the anti-republican sentiments within (former) Palestine itself–sentiments that would likely be exploited by the neighboring geopoliticians–I just don’t see a mini-EU out there. Hope I’m dead wrong!


    Andrew Arato is one of the best theoretical minds in the contemporary American academia. In fact, I had the privilege of studying under Prof. Arato for a good number of years. He served in my doctoral dissertation committee and much of my intellectual development I owe it to him. He not only taught me about his own social and political thought but also introduced me to the thought of a number of great theoreticians among them Hannah Arendt.

    So, it is only natural that I have also been influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt including her thesis presented in On Revolution where she discusses the importance of building state structures from below with the participation of the different social units in the constitution making process (pouvoir constituant). Among the points I make in my doctoral thesis which focused on the case of Argentina is precisely the fact that in Argentina (I would add in some other Latin American countries as well) there was a missed opportunity to follow the American model of Federalism and constitution making from below. Instead Argentina presented a model of state formed from above that as soon as conflict arose it led to authoritarian and more centralizing forms of government. As such the process of state formation led to state failure precisely because it did not have an inclusive constitutional and decentralized state that would have enabled more input from civil society in the enactment of its laws and the direction of state policies.

    However, the Israeli case is different altogether.

    First the goal of the Zionist movement was to create a state that would serve as the national home for the Jewish people given the failure of the European state to emancipate the Jew beyond the realm of formal civil rights. The Dreyfus Affair epitomized this failure of the enlightenment to provide equal rights to the Jews, thus Zionism is the representation of the disillusionment of the Jews with the modern liberal state and ended up embracing the European nationalism of the 19th century. A state for a nation becomes the principle which was later embraced in the aftermath of WWI by the League of Nations following the Wilson Doctrine. This is the way, in which many states were created in Europe after the Great War, most of whom prevail to this very day. This principle of the nation-state persisted even after the collapse of the communism two decades ago as it is demonstrated in the breakup of the Yugoslavian and the Czechoslovakian states into different national or ethnic states.

    Israel was created by international law with a partition resolution that, as Arato pointed out, instructed to create a constitutional system where rights of minorities be respected. But the Jews eventually had to secure the state granted to them by the United Nations in the battlefield. The Arab population declared war on the Jews already in the 1920’s, it intensified in the years 1936-1939 and it turned worse after the partition resolution in 1947. Israel had to fight a very hostile Arab population and the invasion of several Arab armies.

    The need to fight such a tough war, to secure the economic resources to sustain the population, and absorb immigrants inevitably led to a strong state that organized society from above and rather quickly.

    Very much contrary to the case of the United States, I cannot see how Israel had any empirical possibility of applying the principle of constitution making from below with maximum participation under the special pressing circumstances she found herself.

    Furthermore, Yehuda Magnes and Hannah Arendt’s ideas of forming an Arab/Jewish confederation or a bi-national Federal state on a land where so much blood was spilled between both communities was impractical from the outset. Magnes himself understood that bi-nationalism was a lost cause in the aftermath of an atrocious Arab massacre of a Jewish medical convoy. Magnes then he resigned from the presidency of the Hebrew University and returned to his native America where he died a few months later.

    By the same token, the bi-national state model proposed by Edward Said and embraced by Arato is as impractical now as it was in 1948. If negotiations since Oslo have led nowhere, negotiations over the structure of a bi-national or consociational state are unlikely to bring about better results. Why the latter would have more chances than the former to succeed?

    Israelis generally accepted Oslo after the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992) after being conscious that the occupation of Palestinian territory was unsustainable. Since then they always voted for the candidate that promised to work towards peace in the framework of a two-state solution, where Israelis and Palestinians would pursue separate ways (political divorce). This Israelis voted for Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 on the premise that he would pursue peace; for Ehud Barak in 1999 to restore the peace process and for Ehud Olmert in 2005 to pursue the road of separation from the Palestinians. Yet, when Israelis felt the country’s security was compromised they voted for Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, for Ariel Sharon in 2001, and for Netanyahu again in 2009 and 2013.

    Arato assumes that the main problem of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process is the expansion of Israeli settlements. Although I am willing to admit that settlements are unhelpful and often poison the atmosphere of the negotiations, it is worthwhile to read the memoirs of diplomats involved in the process such as Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk to know that Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat’s refusal to sign an agreement had nothing to do with the settlements.
    During the Camp David II negotiations (July 2000), the Israelis offered a generous territorial concession that included 95% of the West Bank and full withdrawal from Gaza and obviously dismantlement of the settlements in those territories. However, it was the issue of Jerusalem and the demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be granted the right of return to Israel proper that triggered Arafat’s resistance. The same scenario was repeated in Taba a year and a half later. In other words, it was not clear whether the Palestinians aspired to achieve self-determination or sought to extinguish the Jewish character of Israel by demographic means. Everything seems to indicate they preferred the latter.

    So here there is a Palestinian-Arab population that is hostile to the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens and a Jewish population and leadership that overwhelmingly support a separation. So, what sense does it make to think that a bi-national solution (Federal or non-Federal) could function under these circumstances where both sides look at things so differently?

    After the Israeli victory in 1948, the Arabs received citizenship and rights in the State of Israel. Unfortunately, since that victory came after a bloody war (where Israel lost 1% of its population), Arab Israelis lived under martial law for another 18 years. Yet, Arabic was adopted as one of the official languages of the country and yet state committees worked on how to integrate the Arab minority in the state and the civil society and how to provide them with health and educational services. For obvious reasons Arabs are not subjected to military compulsory service in the Israel Defense Forces. That without question has affected their social mobility as military service is an important social component in Israeli society (ultra-orthodox communities suffered a similar problem for the same reasons).

    After 1967, the status of the Arab minority in Israel improved. Many of the Arab villages were developed, and Arabs were seen more serving as senior officials, judges, in the Foreign Service and in other positions. There have been Arab members of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) since 1949. Currently there are twelve Arab Knesset members that represent almost 10% of the representatives.
    Likewise, the Arabs access to health services as well as to education has improved considerably. In 1999, 97% Arab children attended school, 46% completed high school and 19% obtained university degrees. This represents a 1500% increase in 40 years. Arabs conform today 33% of the population in Israeli colleges. Likewise, the Arab’s standard of living improved and employment dramatically increased. (See more data in Ephraim Karsh “Israeli Arabs Deprived or Radicalized” ) Arabs also participate in Israel’s technological revolution but of course in this sphere as well as in other areas there is room for improvement.

    But the reality is also that Arabs have turned more nationalistic and radicalized as they tend to identify with the struggle of their Palestinian brothers in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli-Arab establishment has rejected the very definition of Israel as a Jewish state claiming that it excludes them from the polity. The Arab leadership also rejected Israel’s national symbols and many of their leaders turned openly hostile to Zionism. It is no wonder that often the Arab minority is perceived by many Israelis as siding with their enemies. Clearly the complex larger Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian/Israeli conflict in particular makes a successful integration of the Arab Israeli minority harder. This is why is crucial to achieve peace between the parties, based on a two-state solution or complete separation.

    Israel is neither France nor the United States. Israel was created to provide a national home for the Jewish people and to serve also a larger Jewish population living in an often uncertain world.

    Since its inception Israel has absorbed not only survivors of the Nazi Holocaust as Arato rightly points out. It also received more than 500,000 Jews that were arbitrarily and cruelly expelled and dispossessed war from Arab lands. It also took in Jews from the Soviet Union whose rights as Jews were denied. Likewise, Jews from Iran found shelter in Israel in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution that was hostile to them. Jews from Argentina during the dirty war also found heaven in Israel including the father of the current Argentinean Foreign Minister. Currently Israel is receiving Jews from Europe who feel uncomfortable in light of new waves of anti-Semitism.

    Therefore, Israel is not just a static country. It is a unique state tied to the contingencies of a population that does not necessarily live within its territorial boundaries. Thus, Israel unfortunately cannot afford to be the neutral liberal state of its citizens that many in the world demand it to be but it can aspire to expand the conditions and implement equal of rights for its minorities. If peace based on separation between Israel and the Palestinians can be achieved such development is to be expected.

    Arato knows that rights and citizenship do not take a life of their own just by virtue of law enactment alone. A bi-national state as an alternative to the two-state solution will not improve the situation neither of the Arabs nor of the Jews. Less so if the West Bank and Gaza are added. That situation will inevitably lead to a civil war. It is no wonder that the radical Islamic group Hamas has adopted the very same political formula.

    Luis Fleischman, Ph. D
    Jupiter Florida

  3. I am deeply sorry to hear my old friend and student rehash such a standard Zionist narrative. He surely learned none of this from me.

    I am also sorry that he confuses what i tried to distinguish, namely binationalism attacked by Arendt, and the federalism she has rightly supported.

    I find his idea concerning the ownership of the state by jews all over the world, as against some of the people who live there nothing short of reprehensible.

    Finally, i am not optimistic about any federal alternative. I do believe that neither a two state model, nor today’s apartheid like repressive system are viable. But what will take their place, aside from violence? I dont know. I believe only that arendt was heading toward the right solution, if not a particularly likely one.

  4. Andrew, you are absolutely right that not everything I know I learned from you. After all it has been 18 years since I have not had permanent contact with the New School or with you. But if one thing you taught me was to think critically and not to rush to accept dogmatic views or methodologies.

    Just to clarify, although it may appear to you that I am
    rehashing the Zionist narrative, it is still a thought process that I have
    developed by using critical thinking, not reading old Zionist text books. Zionism has different forms. I do not suscribe to any chauvinism. Yet, I admit, I am a proud Zionist and not ashamed of saying so even if this idea is not always popular in certain “progressive” circles.

    I also understood well that you support a pluralistic federal
    state that includes Jewish and Arab sub-units. I only said that given the size of the territory of Israel and Palestine and given the strong tensions between the two communities, the federalist idea remains highly utopic and inapplicable as it will eventually end up in bi-nationalism and civil war whether we want it or not.

    You defined current Israel as “Apartheid”.

    Yet, despite its ethnical-national character, Israel’s
    democracy is not fictional. It is reflected in the existence of democratic political institutions. It has an autonomous judiciary that follows, mostly, British common law (with the exceptions that you rightly pointed out such as the problematic marital law that follows the Ottoman Millet system). Likewise, Israeli courts often rule relying on individual and civil rights.

    It is no wonder that Israeli Jews and Arabs as well as Palestinians living in the occupied territories resort to these courts. Israel also has a vibrant public sphere and freedom of speech where issues are openly subjected to public debate. Among the topics debated is also the relation with the Palestinians and the situation of the Arab minorities.

    Apartheid is a very rigid policy of discrimination based on specific laws of segregation. From 1948 to 1994 Blacks in South Africa could not vote. Likewise, they could not hold political office. Whites and Blacks could not use the same public bathrooms, public transportation or restaurants. A Black lawyer could not provide services to a white man and vice-versa. The same applied to medical doctors and other professions.

    Nothing like this happens In Israel. There have been Arabs in the Israeli Cabinet. The judge that sent the former president of Israel to jail was an Arab. All this would have been inconceivable
    under the South African Apartheid.

    With regard to the West Bank and Gaza, these territories are not part of Israel sovereignty. The Palestinians are running their own institutions. If you refer to the burdens of the checkpoints
    or the separation fence, this has to do with security needs not with a policy of segregation. Still, I admit holding those territories is unsustainable.

    I repeat, the two-state solution based on land for peace will be the beginning of the reconciliation process. De –Zionisation is not the answer.

  5. Dear Mr. Arato,

    I won’t talk about your understanding of Zionism, which is (in my humble opinion) very cartoonish. I try to set the record straight here.

    I would just like to remind you that merging nationality with citizenship (which is what you call for) is not applicable in multinational societies. If Israel were to declare that all Israelis are part of the same “Israeli nationality”, that would mean two things:
    1) Israeli Jews can no longer identify with the Jewish collective in the diaspora
    2) Palestinian-Israelis would no longer be recognized as a national minority by Israel but merely as a linguistic minority: Arabic-speaking Israelis, like my great-grandparents who spoke only Arabic (and French) when they moved to Israel from Morocco in the 1950s. As far as I can tell, Palestinian-Israelis don’t want to be part of a “civic Israeli people”. They want the state of Israel to grant them collective rights as a Palestinian minority.

    Merging nationality with citizenship looks liberal on paper, but it is not. The Québécois, the Corsicans, the Catalans, and other minorities resent the fact that their country’s constitutions do not recognize them as distinct nationalities. This is precisely what brought Québec and Catalonia on the brink of secession.

    I, too, believe that Israel should recognize an Israeli or Hebrew nationality for post-Zionist Israelis who define themselves exclusively on the basis of their citizenship. But wanting this Israeli nationality to encompass all Israeli citizens is not a good idea.

    All the best,
    Bernard Bohbot

  6. Haha, Mr. Bohbot, whoever you are. You made me reread my old piece, and guess what, i find it pretty good still. you of course misunderstood everything in it. But so what, you are by no means the worst of the defenders of the exclusionary setup.

  7. Dear Mr. Arato,

    Excuse me for my belated reply (2 1/2 years!). I did not misunderstand your article at all. You still subscribe to Kohn’s dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism. This dichotomy has been criticized by most scholars of nationalism for 30 years now (especially Rogers Brubaker), largely because there is no such thing as a culturally neutral state. Even the US is not that neutral. Most American states have declared English as their sole official language in the 1980s and 90s in response to the demographic growth of Hispanic communities. Canada is not neutral either. On the federal government is culturally neutral but not the provinces.

    The most interesting part is that both the anti-Zionist far left and the neo-Zionist far right, with their monist mindset, keep saying that a state cannot belong both to the Jewish people (including the diaspora) and its non-Jewish citizens. I’d like to know why. Does a child need to choose between his father and his mother?

    Eastern European states (and Israel was established by people who came from Eastern Europe) do not merge nationality with citizenship, as they were created much later than Western states. Thus national identities cristallized before the state was established. It was impossible to impose a uniform national identity upon citizens who identified with different national movements. This is why they split nationality and citizenship. Had they decided to merge both concepts (like in the West) that would have created a new problem: the non-recognition of national minorities. I’m pretty sure that if Israel declared itself an Israeli, rather than a Jewish state, and tried to impose this identity on its Arab citizens by denying their connexion with the Palestinian and the Arab nation, you’d be the first one to denounce this policy, with good reason.

    There is surely a way for Israel to retain its Jewish character without alienating Palestinian-Israelis. Chaim Gans proposes to turn Israel within the green line into a Jewish-Arab state (instead of a Jewish state) in which Jews would remain their majority. This is pretty much what the Meretz party calls for but very few Arabs still vote for them.

    My point is that a state can belong both to the Jewish people and it’s citizens. This is not an “oxymoron” (whether Israel merges or not nationality with citizenship). I also happen to believe that this whole discussion about an Israeli or Jewish national identity is completely abstract and disconnected from the reality on the ground. Neither Jews nor Arabs in Israel identify with a post-Zionist Israeli territorial nation.

    According to international conventions (UNCERD and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission), a state has the obligation to provide equal civil and political rights to all its citizens, not to be culturally neutral or to have a neutral immigration policy. Israel must thus be a state of all its citizens but not a state of all its nationalities (although I think Israel should evolve toward a multinational system within its own borders so its Arab citizens no longer feel excluded).

    Finally, you address the issue of federalism and binationalism. Arendt’s political evolution regarding Zionism was hard to follow and not so consistent. You may probably know that the Mapai, the forerunner of the “evil” Israeli Labor Party (there is no criminal like a left-wing Zionist!) was in favor of a parity state (a binational state with free Jewish immigration) until 1935-36. It renounced this idea during the Arab Revolt, and came to embrace partition (as well as population transfers). This is how conflicts were resolved back then.

    I still believe however that it is not too late to establish a confederal (not a federal) framework between Israelis and Palestinians that may slowly develop more federal features. However, it must be done incrementally, with the consent of both peoples on the ground (the opposite would be tantamount to an annexation).

    My main problem with Arendt and Magnes is that they were willing to impose restrictions on Jewish immigration while Jews were still persecuted in the late 1940s, and there was no way of knowing that their situation would improve so much in the second part of the 20th Century. This is what ultimately forced Martin Buber to acknowledge the shortcomings of cultural Zionism and to accept political Zionism with a heavy heart.

    This is the real contradiction of anti or post-Zionists. You guys always insist on the contradictions of Zionism allegedly because a state cannot be both Jewish and democratic. But you guys keep saying that while Jews were still persecuted, the only ethical solution was to limit drastically Jewish immigration to Palestine. Marxists are supposed to be materialistic but when it comes to Israel the far left succumbs to the worst kind of idealism!

    Bernard Bohbot

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